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HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION 



HON. GEO. S. BOUTWELL'S ADDRESS 



BEFORE THE 



Boot and Shoe Club of Boston 



DECEMBER 22, 1897 




BOSTON : 

J. E. Farwfll & Co., Printers, 
1898. 



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Mr. President and Gentlemen: 

As I was forewarned by the gentleman from whom I 
received your invitation to meet the members of the Bos- 
ton Boot and Shoe Club this evening, that the time for 
the discussion of the topic before us was. limited to two 
hours, and that four persons were to participate in the 
debate, I have forecast the observations that I have had 
in mind that I might avoid the danger of trespassing 
upon the privileges of others who are to address you. 

Since the organization of the government there have 
been four opportunities for the annexation of territory 
within continental lines, and all of them have been 
accepted. In the same period of time there have been 
three tenders of insular possessions, two of them with- 
out direct consideration in money, and all of them have 
been declined. 

The first of these was the tender of the Sandwich 
Islands, made through our then Commissioner, Mr. 
Elisha H. Allen, in the year 1852. It was in the early 
months of Mr. Fillmore's administration, when Mr. Web- 
ster was Secretary of State. 

Mr. Allen had been my acquaintance and friend from 
the year 1847, when we were associated as members of 
the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and as 
members also of an important Special Committee. 

Upon his arrival in Boston he took lodgings at the 
Adams House where I was then living. Our meetings 
at the table and otherwise were frequent and it was 
then that I received from Mr. Allen the statement that 



Hawaiian Annexation, 

he came with authority, carte blanche, from the king 
to tender the islands to the United States. There may 
have been terms and conditions, but none were mention- 
ed by Mr. Allen. At the same time he informed me 
that the offer had been declined by Mr. Webster. 

The treaty for the acquisition of the island of St. 
Thomas, that was negotiated by Mr. Seward in Presi- 
dent Johnson's administration, was not ratified by the 
Senate. The cause of its failure, or the circumstances 
incident to its failure, have been the subject of contro- 
versy. The undertaking failed, and that controversy 
should not now be revived. 

In General Grant's first term the country had an oppor- 
tunity to acquire so much of the island of San Domingo 
as is known by that name. The terms of acquisition 
were favorable. The project was supported resolutely 
by General Grant, when his influence in the country had 
not suffered any serious impairment. The offer was re- 
jected by the Senate, and there were no indications of a 
controlling public opinion adverse to its action. 

Thus it appears that there have been three favorable 
opportunities for the acquisition of insular possessions, 
all of which have been declined. Two of them were 
within a day's sail of our mainland coasts, while one of 
them, and that the one now urged upon the country, is 
more than two thousand miles from our nearest harbor 
on the Pacific Ocean. 

The question of the extension of slavery was involved 
in the projects for the annexation of Louisiana, Texas 
and California, and except for the existence of that ques- 
tion the acquisition of those vast territories would have 
received a general support in all parts of the country. 

The fourth was the acquisition of Alaska, a territory 
that in 1867 offered but few attractions to the people of 
the United States. It is worthy of remark that the men 



Haiva Han Annexation. 

of the revolutionary era contemplated a union with 
Canada. 

This resume warrants the statement that the country- 
has accepted continental territory as a wise public policy, 
now fully justified by experience, and that it has as uni- 
formly rejected insular possessions. 

And, further, this resum6 warrants the statement that 
the burden of proof is upon those who demand a change 
in our public policy. 

The public policy of the country may not have been 
based upon distinct propositions resting in the public 
mind, but I formulate that policy in two propositions, 
namely : — First, continental acquisitions of contiguous 
territory tend to peace ; second, the acquisition of insu- 
lar territories increases the chances of war and adds to 
the difficulties in the way of conducting war. 

If the first proposition is under question in the mind of 
anyone, much support may be found in our own experi- 
ence and in the recent experience of other countries. The 
force of the North was augmented immensely in our Civil 
War by the consideration that two contiguous nations 
would not remain at peace, except during brief intervals 
between long and lengthening periods of open or smothered 
hostilities. 

By unification the Provinces and States of Germany and 
Italy have been forced into peaceful relations with each 
other. 

And, if now it were possible for France, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal to unite into one Confederated Republic 
they would not only command peace for themselves, but 
they might dictate peace for Europe. 

The possession by Great Britain of the Canadas has 
given rise to many, I may say to most, of the questions 
that have disturbed our relations with England during the 
last sixty years. I mention the Oregon dispute, the 



Hawaiian Annexation. 

San Juan dispute, the Caroline affair, the Northeastern 
boundary controversy, the Fenian invasions, the fisheries 
and now the seal fishery in Behring Sea. 

If the United States and the Canadas were under one 
government the killing of seal upon the open sea would 
not be defended by anyone. 

It is to be admitted that small countries and minor com- 
munities are strengthened and protected by union with 
strong states. That, as a practical question, is their 
question and not our question. If the gain is theirs and 
the loss is ours there can be no ground of defence for a 
policy of annexation, unless it can be found in the indul- 
gence of the feeling called sympathy. Sympathy is akin 
to one of the passions, and the guidance of the passions 
in public affairs ought never to be accepted. 

My second proposition is not within the limits of actual 
demonstration, but it can command some support argu- 
mentatively. 

Assume a war with England, would our position be 
strengthened or weakened by the possession of St. Thomas, 
San Domingo or Hayti, or by the possession of one or all 
of the islands of the Carribean Sea ? 

Assume a war with England, or Russia, or Japan, or 
China, a possible, aggressive and warlike power in a future 
not far away, and would the possession of the eight tropi- 
cal islands in the mid-Pacific and extending over three 
degrees of latitude and six meridians of longitude, be a 
help or a peril ? Would a coaling station or a harbor of 
resort at the mouth of the Pearl River, two thousand miles 
and more from our Pacific coasts give security, either in 
form or in fact, to California, Oregon, Washington, or to 
the dwellers on the shore and islands of Alaska? 

Does the example of England attract us? The august 
ceremonies which closed the sixtieth year of the reign of 
Queen Victoria, were clouded by the fact that those had 

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Hawaiian Annexation. 

been years of uninterrupted wars, — wars in which there 
had been hardships and dangers in unequal contests with 
inferior peoples ; wars made necessary by the policy of 
England to preserve unbroken and to strengthen, if possi- 
ble, the chain of empire that England has carried around 
the globe. For England this may have been a wise policy. 
An attempt at its imitation by us cannot bring either suc- 
cess or honor. England conquers that she may inhabit 
and trade. A small island in a northern sea with a hardy 
and adventurous population must gain new lands as a 
refuge and home for its accumulating masses. Thus it 
seeks and secures protection for its home industries by 
first subduing and then clothing the millions of Asia and 
the half- clad tribes of Africa. 

Thus and by such processes was the foundation laid for 
the great eulogium which Mr. Webster pronounced upon 
our ancestors in America and in England when he said of 
the Colonists, " They raised their flag against a power to 
which, for purposes of foreign conquest and subjugation, 
Rome in the height of her glory is not to be compared ; a 
power that has dotted over the surface of the whole globe 
with its possessions and military posts whose morning 
drum beat, following the sun and keeping company with 
the hours, circles the earth with one continuous and un- 
broken strain of the martial airs of England." 

But the example of England is not for us. The field 
for conquest, for appropriation is about all occupied. Our 
theory is a theory of self government. Such has been our 
practice. Next we demand equality of citizenship in the 
States and equality of States in the Union. All this is 
inconsistent with the acquisition of distant and incon- 
gruous populations. And nowhere can there be found a 
more incongruous population than the present population 
of the Hawaiian Islands. 

The future of the United States cannot be predicted, but 



Hawaiian Annexation, 

of unoccupied territory we have a vast domain. Its vast- 
ness may be set forth in one statement : If the population 
of all the States and Territories of the Union could be 
transported to the State of Texas the number of inhabi- 
tants to the square mile would not exceed the number now 
resident in the Statesof Rhode Island and Massachusetts, 

By the treaty of 1875 and the amendment of 1887, we 
have as full control of the trade of the Hawaiian Islands 
as we should have were those Islands made a part of the 
United States. Our manufactures, from iron bridges to 
friction matches, are entered without duty, and in return 
the sugar, rice, coffee and other products of the Islands 
are admitted free of duty at all our custom houses. 

By the treaty of 1887 we acquired Pearl River Harbor, 
the most valuable harbor of the Islands. 

The treaty of 1875 contains a stipulation that as long 
as the treaty shall remain in force the authorities of the 
Islands will not " dispose of or create any lien upon this 
port, harbor, or other territory, ... or grant any special 
privilege or right of use therein, to any other power, state 
or government, nor make any treaty by which any other 
nation shall obtain the same privileges, relative to the 
admission of any articles free of duty." 

These agreements and stipulations are all very well, 
says the advocate of annexation, but the treaty may be 
abrogated whenever we decline the treaty of annexation. 
What are the probabilities? In 1875 when the Islands 
were free to deal with England or with any other nation, 
when the United States had no foothold, we dictated the 
terms of the treaty. 

Again in 1887, under the lead of Senator Edmunds, and 
when there was a heavy adverse public sentiment in the 
United States, and the treaty was in peril from our action, 
the Hawaiian authorities conceded the possession of Pearl 
River Harbor. For what reason have all these conces- 

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Hawaiian An vexation. 

sions been made? For filly years the fortunes of the 
Islands have been in our hands, and the day of their free- 
dom from our control is far away. 

All the benefits that can come from annexation are 
now enjoyed by us, and they will continue to be enjoyed 
by us and by our successors through many generations, 
while we now are, and they hereafter are to be relieved of 
all responsibility for the government of the Islands. More- 
over, the Islands can rest securely in mid ocean, freed 
from the anxieties and apprehensions of war, as Belgium 
and Switzerland are secure, though surrounded by rival 
and hostile States. 

Whence this security for our supremacy in the Islands ? 
It is to be found in two facts. First, in the situation 
of the Islands with reference to other countries. When 
we had acquired California and had connected it by rail- 
roads with the older States of the Union, the United 
States became the convenient, indeed the only valuable 
market for the products of the Islands. Distant as we 
are from the Islands, we are their only neighbors. 
Japan is 3400 miles from Honolulu. Hong Kong is 5000 
miles away. The countries of Central and South Ameri- 
ca can only be reached by ocean voyages of three, four, 
five and six thousand miles. 

My second reason is equally conclusive. Those dis- 
tant countries are of no considerable value as markets 
for the products of the Islands. 

In 1896 the total of exports was $15,515,230, and of 
this the sum of $55,132 found a market in other coun- 
tries. In the same year the imports amounted to 
$7,164,562. Of this sum the imports from the United 
States amounted to $5,235,729. The exports of sugar 
to the United States in the year 1896 amounted to 
$14,932,173. 

What would be the consequences of the abrogation of 

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Hawaiian Annexation. 

the treaty ? What the consequences of the annexation 
of the Islands by Japan or by England ? The loss of the 
free American market and the imposition of a duty by 
the United States of forty per cent or more on the sugar 
product of the Islands would inevitably follow. What 
next? The depreciation of the sugar plantations at the 
rate of twenty- five per cent or more, and the ruin of the 
owners. And who are the owners? The owners of the 
plantations are the two thousand and seven hundred 
voters in a population of 109,000, and those whom they 
represent. The owners are the meagre minority now in 
authority and who constitute the government of Hawaii. 
They cannot consent to annexation by any other country. 
They cannot afford to abrogate the treaty. From 1882 
to 1887, when propositions for the abrogation of the 
treaty were pending in our Congress, the business of the 
Islands was interrupted, property was depressed, the 
sugar planters were threatened with bankruptcy and the 
representatives of the Hawaiians appeared before the 
Committees on Foreign Affairs, pleading for the preser- 
vation of the treaty. 

The pecuniary interests are much larger now than they 
then were, and by those interests any and every govern- 
ment that may be set up, by whatever name called and 
by whomsoever managed, will be controlled. The old 
monarchy had no affection for the United States, but its 
policy was subordinated to our policy, and such must be 
the condition of every successor, whether an oligarchy, 
a monarchy, or a republic. 

From these general remarks I turn to the consideration 
of the circumstances under which we are invited to accept 
the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. We are not so 
far removed in time from the events that occurred in 
Hawaii in the early months of the year 1893, that we 
may disregard the political character and moral quality 

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Hawaiia n Annexation. 

of the proceedings, called a revolution, when we are in- 
vited to accept the territory that was then and thus 
wrested from its ancient proprietors. 

There is nothing sacred in a monarchy, indeed there is 
nothing sacred in any government, whatever its form or 
name. The right of a government to exist comes from 
the will of the people freely expressed. This test is 
fatal to the claim of those who now rule in Hawaii. 

There are forty thousand Hawaiians in the Islands and 
of those thirty-one thousand are of unmixed blood. It is 
claimed that under the old Regime there were ten thousand 
voters. They owed allegiance to the old government. 
There may have been others who were subjects. These 
as a body have never been consulted. Assume, what I 
do assume, that the Queen had no rights except such as 
may have been derived from the people, and that there 
was a continuing right in the people to supersede her in 
authority, and yet the fact remains that that power in the 
people has never been exercised. 

Mr. Secretary Foster, in the treaty which he prepared 
in the last days of President Harrison's administration, 
admitted a right as then existing in the Queen and beyond 
her in the heir apparent to the throne. 

By that projet of a treaty the Queen was to be paid the 
sum of $20,000 annually during her life and the Princess 
was to receive in hand from the United States the sum of 
$150,000, provided, however, that those two women, re- 
spectively, should, " in good faith, submit to the authority 
of the government of the United States and the local 
government of the Islands." 

Thus did that projet recognize the personal rights of the 
Queen and also the right of succession in the dynasty of 
which she was then the head. 

There may be those who favor annexation, who will ex- 
cuse themselves in the thought that the government was 

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Hawaiian Annexation. 

only a monarchy, and that its overthrow, however accom- 
plished, was a praiseworthy act. 

Governments ought not to disregard their moral obliga- 
tions. 

This transaction is tainted with injustice. Injustice it 
may be to the deposed Queen, but assuredly it is tainted 
with injustice to the 40,000 Hawaiians who should be per- 
mitted to speak in regard to the government of their 
native land. And we who have maintained the doctrine 
of Home Rule, w* o have pleaded for Ireland, who have 
raised millions of men from slavery to citizenship, can we 
either defend this proceeding or accept the fruit thereof? 

Finally, what disposition is to be made of the present 
population? Of the native Hawaiians there are about 
40,000, of Japanese 24,000, of Chinese 21,000, of Portu- 
gese 15,000, of Americans 3,000, of British, Germans and 
French combined there are 4,000, of other nationalities a 
thousand. Thus the Islands contain a population of 
109,000. Are the Japanese and Chinese to be deported, 
the plantations to be abandoned and their owners to be 
consigned to ruin ? 

The pending treaty prohibits the further immigration 
of Chinese, and those who are now resident in the Islands 
are excluded from the mainland of the United States. 
By annexation the country will have in view the alterna- 
^ tive of a vassal population within its jurisdiction, or the 
presence of a Mongolian State in the Union. 



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